We continue with some basic definitions of independence and disjointness:
Events A and B are independent if P(A∩B)=P(A)P(B). Knowing that event A occurs tells us nothing about event B.
In contrast, events A and B are disjoint if A occurring means that B cannot occur.
What about the case of events A, B and c?
Events A, B and C are independent if
P(A∩B)=P(A)P(B), P(A∩C)=P(A)P(C), P(B∩C)=P(B)P(C)P(A∩B∩C)=P(A)P(B)P(C)
So you need both pair-wise independence and three-way independence.
Yet another famous example of probability that comes from a gambling question.
We have fair dice. Which of the following events is most likely?
Let's solve for the probability of each event using independence.
P(A)=1−P(Ac) since the complement of at least one 6 is no 6's at all=1−(56)6the 6 dice are independent, so we just multiply them all≈0.665P(B)=1−P(no 6's)−P(one 6)=1−(56)12−12(16)(56)11... does this look familiar?≈0.619P(C)=1−P(no 6's)−P(one 6)−P(two 6's)=1−2∑k=0(18k)(16)k(56)18−k... it's Binomial probability!≈0.597Conditioning is the soul of probability.
How do you update your beliefs when presented with new information? That's the question here.
Consider 2 events A and B. We defined conditional probability a P(A|B), read the probability of A given B.
Suppose we just observed that B occurred. Now if A and B are independent, then P(A|B) is irrelevant. But if A and B are not independent, then the fact that B happened is important information and we need to update our uncertainty about A accordingly.
conditional probability P(A|B)=P(A∩B)P(B)if P(B)>0
Prof. Blitzstein gives examples of Pebble World and Frequentist World to help explain conditional probability, but I find that Legos make things simple.
The intersection of events A and B can be given by
P(A∩B)=P(B)P(A|B)=P(A)P(B|A)Note that if A and B are independent, then conditioning on B means nothing (and vice-versa) so P(A|B)=P(A), and P(A∩B)=P(A)P(B).
The odds of an event with probability p is p1−p.
An event with probability 34 can be described as having odds 3 to 1 in favor, or 1 to 3 against.
Let H be the hypothesis, or the event we are interested in.
Let D be the evidence (event) we gather in order to study H.
The prior probability P(H) is that for which H is true before we observe any new evidence D.
The posterior probability P(H|D) is, of course, that which is after we observed new evidence.
The likelihood ratio is defined as P(D|H)P(Dc|Hc)
Applying Bayes' Rule, we can see how the posterior odds, prior odds and likelihood odds are related:
P(H|D)=P(D|H)P(H)P(D)P(Hc|D)=P(D|Hc)P(Hc)P(D)⇒P(H|D)P(Hc|D)⏟posterior odds of H=P(H)P(Hc)⏟prior odds of H×P(D|H)P(D|Hc)⏟likelihood ratioTo go from odds back to probability
p=p/q1+p/q for q=1−pView Lecture 4: Conditional Probability | Statistics 110 on YouTube.