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Keith Frankish *Mind and Supermind*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004.
Pp. xiv + 255. \$75.00 (Cloth: ISBN 0-521-81203-8)

This is one of the few book-length manuscripts that focuses almost entirely on the nature of belief. In theorizing about belief, Frankish aims at vindicating folk psychology in a way that will account for the insights of those who defend austere and robust versions of folk psychology. His approach is novel and dovetails in ways he sometimes acknowledges with other philosophical work by action theorists, philosophers of mind, and epistemologists as well as related work by social and cognitive psychologists.

The book is well organized, with each chapter systematically building upon material covered in previous chapters. It consists of eight chapters and a very short conclusion. The book can, however, be divided into three major sections. In the first section (chapters 1-3) Frankish articulates his theory of mind and the implications for thinking about folk psychology, focusing on belief, considering some challenges and theories of belief similar to his own along the way. In the second section (chapters 4-5) he develops his theory of belief further, fleshing out some of the features presented in skeletal form earlier, and considers how the fuller picture overcomes some of the challenges offered in section one. Finally, the third section (chapters 6-8) is devoted to testing the theory of belief and mind he offers by considering some challenges to folk psychology. In this section he also applies the theory of mind developed to problems in the philosophy of mind (specifically, *akrasia*, self-deception, and first-person authority) as well as empirical psychology.

Frankish defends a two-strand theory of mind that is similar in many ways (which Frankish acknowledges) to the view of the mind proposed by dual-process theorists in psychology. The strand 1 mind is dubbed the ‘basic mind’ and the strand 2 mind the ‘supermind’. Absent any knowledge of the details of Frankish’s theory, one may assume that this is like the distinction Keith Lehrer makes between the mind and the ‘metamind’ (or the distinction between object level cognition and metacognition made by psychologists). What Frankish proposes is quite different. In effect, in theorizing about the architecture of the mind and the implications for folk psychology, Frankish brings together two views of the mind. One is austere and has revisionist implications for folk psychology, while the other is rich and leaves our folk psychology intact. Specifically, Frankish gives an austere functionalist account of strand 1 mental states (with mental states being ‘thickly carved’ functional states) and a rich functionalist account of strand 2 mental states (mental states are ‘finely carved’ functional states). Folk psychological explanations (belief-desire explanations) pick out sustaining causes in the strand 1 mind while they pick out dynamic causes in the strand 2 mind (50).

As noted, Frankish focuses on belief (with occasional discussion of desires and intentions) as the means of highlighting and defending his theory of mind. Strand 1 belief is non-conscious, not apt to be activated in occurrent form, partial, passively formed, not

language-involving, and common to both humans and non-human animals. Strand 2 belief is conscious, apt to be activated in occurrent form, flat-out, can be actively formed, frequently language-involving, and unique to humans and any other language users. The two-strand theory of belief is associated with further differences in how reasoning and the nature of the mind itself should be understood. In the case of reasoning, strand 1 reasoning is non-conscious, interpretable as Bayesian, and depends on sub-personal processes that may be non-explicit, are probably not language-driven, and are not under active control. Strand 2 reasoning, on the other hand, is conscious, usually classical rather than Bayesian, can be actively controlled, is explicit, and is frequently language-driven (50).

Conspicuously absent from this book is any sustained engagement with relevant recent research in empirical psychology. I do not count myself among those who argue that fruitful inquiry into the nature of the mind can only occur when wearing a lab coat or, minimally, when paying careful attention to the research of psychologists and neuroscientists. However, I must confess that I find work in the philosophy of psychology on the scale of this book to have the sense of being incomplete when cognate research by scientists is largely ignored. Apart from a relatively brief discussion (226-33) in the final chapter of the implications of his theory of mind for dual-process theory, evolutionary and developmental psychology, and clinical psychology, Frankish discusses very little of the research from cognate scientific fields that supports some of the claims he makes. Similarities between his project and research by psychologists on dual-process theory is mentioned and then dropped. And Frankish completely ignores the literature on cognitive dissonance, metacognition, and mental control that bears directly on his project. This is not to say that Frankish fails to make a significant contribution to the literature on belief and on the philosophy of psychology more broadly. It is just that much of the experimental data and theoretical work by psychologists lends support to Frankish's philosophical work and would have strengthened the defense of his theory if mentioned. One can hope, however, that this book is just one part of a larger research project that will be vindicated (or not!) by experimental evidence from the mind sciences.

Any problems aside, in *Mind and Supermind* Frankish offers a fresh and challenging new perspective to debates over folk psychology and the nature of belief. The chief value of this work lies more in its role as a contribution to the sparse but growing literature by philosophers whose concerns are not explicitly epistemological on the nature of belief. But there is much in this book that should be of value for epistemologists (especially those working on doxastic voluntarism and epistemic responsibility). So the potential readership goes beyond those working in the philosophy of psychology. This book merits careful reading by anyone with research interests in folk psychology and especially philosophers and psychologists interested in the nature of belief.

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